Many distance bounding protocols have been proposed recently, with encouraging results. However, there is no distance bounding protocol without final signature that provides success probability of attacker smaller than ( 3/4 ) n in the presence of all frauds. In this paper, we propose a novel distance bounding protocol without a confirmation message based on two bits mixed challenges. It is prove that our protocol provides a reduced false acceptance rate under all those frauds, remarkably the terrorist fraud.
Introduction
Distance bounding protocol was first suggested by Desmedt [1] by introducing the distance bounding concept based on the measurement of the round trip time of exchanged messages. A number of distance bounding protocols were proposed in current years [2] - [4] , [6] , [7] . They are classified into two classes depending on whether a final signature is involved. Their security was so far mainly evaluated by analyzing their resilience to three types of attacks: Distance Fraud, Mafia Fraud and Terrorist Fraud.
In Distance Fraud attacks, a sole dishonest prover convinces the verifier that he is at a different distance than he really is. A distance fraud attack is possible when there is no relationship between the challenge bits and the response bits exchanged during the distance verification. In Mafia Fraud attacks, the prover is honest, but an attacker tries to modify the distance that the verifier establishes by interfering with their communication. Terrorist Fraud is similar to Mafia Fraud. In this attack scenario, the legitimate prover P is dishonest and helps a illegal prover P  to convince the verifier V of a wrong distance without giving its private key. In some protocols, the terrorist fraud is always achieved with probability equal to one (i.e. [3] ). And Terrorist Fraud attack is not discussed in another protocols (i.e. [6] , International Symposium on Computers & Informatics (ISCI 2015) [7] ).
Contribution. Defeating three attacks simultaneously is quite a difficult challenge and an ongoing research topic. We proposed a new distance bounding protocol without final signature. Our protocol is different in following sense. A new rule of fast exchange has been used to guarantee the randomness of binary responses. That is, the adversary can not predict the challenges and send the corresponding responses earlier. In this way, our protocol can against three fraud attacks simultaneously, and achieve a strong security level.
Proposed Distance Bounding Protocol
Description of Protocol The protocol described in the section consists of identification phase, nonce delivery phase and fast bit exchange phase. As shown in Fig.1 k is n bits long. The implementation of the security protocol includes three parts, which are presented as follows.
Identification phase:
In order to carry out the verify process, V must identify the prover P to access its key information.
( 
Upon receiving A and B , P extracts v from message A and verifies its integrity using message B as follow:
If the equation is false, P will abort the protocol. The value v is divided into three
where:
Fast bit exchange phase:
The fast bit exchange phase consists of n rounds. In the i -th round, the verifier V measures the challenge-response delay time. 
Security Analysis
In this section, we will analyze the false acceptance rate of the proposed distance bounding protocol against the distance fraud attack, the mafia fraud attack and the terrorist fraud attack. ε ≠ , the congruence of Eq. 1 can never be satisfied. That is, any modification of message A alone will be detected with probability one by P ; If 0 δ ≠ , since 2 k is unknown to the adversary, for any fixed δ , there exists a unique * q Z ε ∈ that satisfies Eq. 1. Therefore, the probability of modifying both
A and B in a way undetected by P is at most 1/ ( 1) q − (equivalently, guessing the value of 2 k ).
Verifier V
Start of rapid bit exchange 
From the law of total probability, [ ] i P Ξ is easily obtained
Finally, the success probability of a distance fraud attack is given by
The false acceptance rate of the proposed distance bounding protocol against mafia fraud attacks is given by
Proof In order for malicious prover P to masquerade as P to V , P must be reply to V 's challenges correctly in each round. To compute M FAR , we assume that P queries P in advance. P sends predicted challenges • i B : the event that the attack is not detected until the i -th round by P .
We can define the success probability of the mafia fraud attack as follows: 
Conclusions
Distance bounding protocols combine cryptographic techniques with physical characteristics of signals to fight against location-related attacks. In this paper, we presented a new secure distance bounding protocol that significantly enhances the proposed ones. New fast exchange rule had been used to promise the random of binary responses. The advantage of the proposed protocol was efficiency and the lower FAR under distance, mafia, and terrorist fraud attack. The most important contribution of this paper was that our protocol achieve the ideal security level
(1 / 2) n against for distance fraud.
